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Diaspora involvement in the development of Somalia1 
 
 
Abdulkadir Osman Farah2 
 
 
Introduction 
After the state collapse 1991, Somali business people showed resilience and 
became champions of telecommunications and commercial activities in Africa. 
With the assistance of Somali diaspora, national and international NGOs, 
hospitals, schools, airfields and business centres were re-constructed. Still, 
Somalia remains the only country in the world where a properly functioning 
government and state does not exist. There is no single unifying authority that 
can exercise internal and external legitimacy and sovereignty. Instead, there are 
multiple complementary and sometimes fiercely competing authorities and sub-
authorities. This lack of proper institutions and governance raises enormous 
challenges to both diaspora community groups abroad, as well as to international 
NGO’s to engage and provide long term assistance for significant social sectors 
such as education.    
 
In 1991, the International Committee for the Development of People (CISP) 
began its humanitarian emergency efforts to help vulnerable groups during the 
civil war. The organisation provided medical supplies and food for displaced 
people. In 1995 the organisation launched its development efforts in the fields of 
health, education and veterinary medicine in South Central Somalia, particularly 
Ceel-Dheer and Harardheere districts. This was a new approach built on 
community empowerment and inclusion. In 2002 CISP expanded its mission to 
Puntland with an education project. CISP’s ambition today is to move towards 
more developmental activities with regard to community empowerment and 
governance. In this connection CISP is searching for new non-traditional donors, 
and how they can contribute to develop the education sector in Somalia.  
 
Hence, CISP commissioned the present study in order to explore the potential 
roles of Diaspora linkages to their communities and their remittances in terms of 
their contributions to developing the educational sector. Indeed, it is already a 
known fact that externally provided humanitarian aid is not sufficient to resolve 
                                                          
1  This paper was presented at the Horn of Africa Workshop: What is the Way out: 
Challenges in Overcoming Governance Crises, Endemic Conflicts and Negative External 
Involvements in the Horn of Africa? The workshop took place May 26, 2008 at Aalborg 
University and was hosted by Development, Innovation and International Political 
Economy Research (DIIPER) in Collaboration with Centre for Comparative Integration 
Studies (CCIS), Aalborg University. 
2  Abdulkadir Osman Farah is currently a PhD candidate in DIIPER, Development, 
Innovation and International Political Economy Research, Aalborg University. 
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the chronic economic crisis in Somalia. The survival of the Somalis relies 
overwhelmingly on the regular remittances from their relatives amongst the 
diaspora.  
 
The main question raised is: How can diaspora initiatives in favour of 
development in Somalia effectively be supported, particularly in the education 
sector? 
 
In order to address this main question, the study will first provide a general 
overview of the Somali diaspora, its remittances to Somalia and the linkages and 
potentials of these remittances to development in Somalia. This section will 
provide some indications of the locations and numbers of the Somali diaspora, 
how much they remit, and what the present contribution of their remittances to 
the reconstruction and development of Somalia is.  
 
This leads to the second part of the study, which aims at exploring the 
importance and potential roles of the Somali diaspora as a non-traditional donor 
to the educational sector. This is done through interviews with diaspora 
communities as well as ‘home-communities’ in Somalia and ‘anecdotal’ 
evidence, through which some light can be shed on how the diaspora supports 
/invests in the education sector in Somalia as well as outlining problems and 
potentials for external aid to such initiatives. Particularly, the study looks at 
Somali diaspora communities in Scandinavia (Denmark), East Africa (Kenya), 
Middle East (Yemen & UAE), North America ( USA & Canada) and the rest of 
Europe (UK and Italy).  
 
 
Background to the migration – development nexus  
The Somalis gained independence in 1960 and were unified under a Western-
styled parliamentary system, forming the country now known as Somalia. Later, 
General Siyad Barre seized power in 1969, expounding “scientific socialism”. 
The regime was supported by military and development aid from the Soviet 
Union (1969–77) and the United States (1978–89) that largely funded the war 
with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region. While the regime formally banned 
manifestations of clan organization, Siyad Barre, in fact used state finances to 
manipulate different clan interest groups and entrench his power to his 
immediate clans.  
 
In 1988, insurrection by the Somali National Movement in Northern Somalia 
met with severe government reprisals. The central region also suffered: perse-
cution of dissenting groups, and political movements had become common 
throughout Somalia. Eventually, the United Somali Congress and the Somali 
Patriotic Movement overthrew Siyad Barre in 1991 (Gundel 2003). The state 
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collapsed. In 1991–1992, 240,000 to 280,000 people died from starvation or 
disease in Southern and Central Somalia alone. At least 40,000 people were 
killed in fighting as the region entered a long period of inter-clan warfare, 
banditry and famine (UNDP 2001). International efforts to broker a resolution to 
the political crisis failed miserably. Today, in some areas, localized politics, 
based on traditional clan-based, municipal, Islamic and local business 
influences, now ensure a degree of stability (Gundel 2003). President Abdullahi 
Yusuf Ahmed was elected in October 2004 by the Transitional Federal 
Parliament (TFP), but to date the new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
still exerts no clear territorial control in Somalia. In the North, the self-declared 
Republic of Somaliland (since 1991) and the self-administered Puntland State of 
Somalia (since 1998) has maintained relatively stable administrations, although 
internationally unrecognised.  
 
 
A general overview of the Somali Diaspora 
Migration is at the heart of the nomadic culture of the Somalis. Pastoral move-
ments across Somalia’s borders with neighbouring countries to graze livestock, 
trade or work has been a common feature for centuries. The nomadic Somalis 
were divided by colonization into five areas: British, Italian, and French 
Somaliland respectively, as well as the Northern Frontier District of the British 
Kenyan Colony, and the Ogaden region of the Ethiopian Empire. In 1960 the 
independent Somali Republic was formed as British and Italian Somaliland 
decided to merge as a first step toward uniting all the Somalia peoples. The 
Northern Frontier District, however, remained in independent Kenya and the 
Ogaden region remained part of Ethiopia. French Somaliland eventually gained 
independence in 1977 as the Republic of Djibouti. Hence, ethnic Somalis have 
traditionally inhabited an area that stretches beyond Somalia’s 1960–1991 
borders, living also in Djibouti, northern Kenya and the Ogaden region of 
present-day Ethiopia. During the colonial period, men from British Somaliland, 
many former nomadic pastoralists, worked as employees of the UK’s Merchant 
Navy, some returning after sojourns in the UK, others staying on.  
 
While the notion of Somalis being an ethnically homogenous group applies for 
Somaliland and Puntland in the north, it does not apply singularly to Southern 
Somalia where analysts often ignore the very large “minority” groups. Most 
distinct of these are the so-called “Bantu” descendants of slaves who were 
imported from what is now Tanzania (Gundel 2003). Other distinct groups are 
the Bajuni and Baravani people who live along the eastern coasts of Somalia. In 
fact, even the large Rahanwein agropastoralist group constitute a heterogeneous 
community whose history and language differs significantly from the nomadic 
Somali clans. It is difficult to assess their number versus the dominant Somali 
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clans, but in southern Somalia these groups were the prime victims of the 
conflict and the famine in 1992.  
 
In the 1960s, many Somali men were employed in the transport sector in East 
Africa, and today they are still an important group in the East African transport 
sector. After independence, disgruntled by unmet promises, many disappointed 
supporters of the Union, especially from the North-western Isaaq clan, migrated 
abroad during the 1960s as they were denied access to positions and resources. 
Since the 1960s, significant numbers of Somalis migrated to work in the oil-rich 
Gulf. By 1987, the number of “Gulf migrants” was estimated at 375,000 
(Ahmed, 2000). These migrants were often relatively well-educated people 
looking for better employment than they could find in Somalia (Marchal, 1996). 
Today, the many Somalis who remained in the Arabian Gulf Arab countries are 
facing difficulties. Employment opportunities have declined dramatically and 
most migrants (Somalis as well as other foreign nationals) are either faced with 
poor legal status or have been forced to leave.  
 
Another migration was related to elite young men and women who went abroad 
to study as they were provided with scholarships from Italy, Britain or the Soviet 
Union. Thus, significant numbers of Somali migrants and their children already 
lived in neighbouring countries, the Gulf, the UK and Italy prior to the first 
refugees in 1979. This is one of the main reasons that Somali refugees from the 
civil war unlike Africans from for instance Rwanda, were able to migrate to the 
West and Middle East in such large numbers: Through the prior migration they 
already has access to connections, and resources. Indeed, the Somali migrants 
tend to be from cities, nomadic families and better-educated families (Gundel 
2003).  
 
The next major migration was related to the war over the Ethiopian Ogaden 
Region between Ethiopia and Somalia. This war provoked a humanitarian crisis, 
which brought about the first massive refugee movement, sending thousands of 
ethnic Somalis into Somalia (Waldron and Hasci, 1995). By 1981 these refugees 
constituted about 20-40 per cent of the population of Somalia (Simons, 1995). 
But, the number of refugees in this group was probably grossly exaggerated 
(Waldron and Hasci, 1995). Most of them came from the Ogaden clan, creating 
considerable tension in regions where they were considered non-residents. From 
1984 to 1991, this group of refugees was accompanied by more Ogaden 
refugees as well as fleeing Ethiopian Oromos (Waldron and Hasci, 1995). Thus, 
already before the civil war, Somalia hosted one of the largest refugee 
populations in Africa.  
 
The eruption of the civil war in 1988 reversed this situation, and generated the 
third major movement – this time from Somalia into the Ethiopian Ogaden 
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Region. More than 600,000 people fled to Ethiopia. This flow was first caused 
by the conflict between SNM and the Siyad Barre regime, and was prompted by 
the bombing of Hargeysa in 1988. The escalation of the conflict in 1991, when 
the USC, with the support of SPM and SNM, ousted Siyad Barre, produced 
further refugee flows. Thus, the largest mass flight of Somalis took place from 
early 1991 when more than 1 million are estimated to have fled fighting in 
southern Somalia. The better-off refugees went abroad to Western countries 
such as Canada, US, UK, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, 
and Australia (Table 1). But, most of the refugees, and significantly the poorest, 
fled to the neighbouring countries, such as Kenya and Ethiopia (Table 2), or 
elsewhere within Somalia as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Reportedly, 80 
per cent of the country’s skilled population has left since the conflict began (EC 
2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the refugee flows are closely linked to the effects of armed conflict, 
migration to the Gulf states was related to the opportunities offered by rapid 
development in the oil producing countries, and was thus not directly poverty 
related. This migration was also related to the lack of job opportunities in 
Somalia. But in both cases it was those with capacities to migrate who did so. 
Thus, the refugees who were able to seek asylum in the West were in social 
status similar to those who migrated to the Gulf States in search of labour. 
Existing networks of the limited number of Somalis who had migrated to Italy, 
UK and other places in Western Europe, and the US before the conflict were 
important in shaping who, how, and where the 
later and much larger numbers of refugees 
went.  
 
“The sheer size of this diaspora means that in 
some ways Somali society as a whole has been 
‘globalized’… Somalia’s principal export is … 
human labour … this is of real significance 
within Somalia, given the remittance flows, 
and has wide-ranging impact on human 
development choices” (UNDP 2001: 132).  
Table 1: Somali Refugee Population By 
Western Country Of Asylum, 1999 (UNHCR 
2000) 
Country Population 
Netherlands  18,500 
United Kingdom 18,100 
Denmark  9,600 
Sweden  7,700 
United States  5,200 
Canada  4,000 
Norway  3,600 
Finland  2,400 
Switzerland  2,400 
Table 2: Somali Refugee Population By 
African Country Of Asylum, 1999 
(UNHCR 2000) 
Country Population 
Ethiopia  180,900 
Kenya  141,100 
Yemen 55,200 
Djibouti  21,600 
South Africa  4,700 
Tanzania  3,300 
Libya  2,900 
Egypt 2,600 
Table 3:  The Estimated Official Size Of The 
Somali Diaspora, 2000 (Gundel 2003) 
Country Population 
Canada  30,000 
United States  25,000 
United Arab Emirates 25,000 
Netherlands  25,000 
Italy 20,000 
United Kingdom 20,000 
Saudi Arabia 20,000 
Denmark  14,000 
Sweden  12,000 
Germany   8,400 
Switzerland    5,400 
Finland    5,300 
Norway    4,000 
Australia    2,000 
 
 6
 
People continued to leave Southern Somalia in large numbers until 1995. Until 
the recent upsurge in conflict in Somalia (2007) there has been a decline in 
refugee flows from Somalia and a gradual process of repatriation and 
reintegration. Yet, a quarter of a million (256,000) Somali refugees remain in 
camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen, and other neighbouring countries 
(Gundel 2003). Furthermore, many more reside in these and other countries 
illegally and hence elude documentation. Hence, the figures in Table 3 represent 
only the official numbers in selected countries. The real size of the Somali 
Diaspora in these and several other countries is likely to be much higher. 
According to UNHCR, the number of registered refugees from Somalia 
worldwide is around half a million people (UNHCR, 2000). 
 
 
The Remittances from the Somali Diaspora  
Financial remittances from Somalis living outside the country are an outstanding 
feature of the Somali economy, and have for long been crucial to the economy. 
Today, the new diaspora in the West has assumed a very important role as a 
source of remittances to family members in Somalia or in refugee camps. 
 
The first migrant workers who went to the Arabian Gulf during the 1970s began 
to send back remittances, using the so-called franco-valuta system. People from 
the Isaaq clan in particular utilized this system, in which foreign exchange was 
transferred to traders who would import commodities for the Somali markets, 
and then give the cash to the families of the migrants. This system worked only 
because the traders had strong linkages to their clan lineages inside Somalia. 
This, together with the practice of migrants settling close to fellow clans-people, 
contributed to a strengthening of clan identity. The system was crucial for the 
provision of foreign exchange, and enabled families in Somalia to import 
consumer goods. Rough estimates suggest that around US$300 million was 
remitted annually from the late 1970s and during the 1980s, equivalent to about 
40 per cent of GNP (Marchal, 1996). 
 
The franco-valuta system was officially banned in 1982 because it increased the 
misuse of much needed foreign exchange, but also because it potentially 
undermined the power of the regime’s own patron-client mechanisms (Marchal, 
1996). Yet, the ban had little effect as it only led to a new system. Thus, the 
direct Xawilaad system developed which did not involve a trader. The 
significance of these remittances grew as part of the emerging parallel economy 
in the 1980s, when they were estimated to be worth US$370 million annually, of 
which 75 per cent came from workers in the Gulf countries (UNDP Somalia, 
2001). The Xawilaad system evolved into the 1990s, where remittances were 
transferred to the armed guerrillas who eventually overthrew the Siyad Barre 
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regime. The early use of mobile radio systems used by the rebel groups such as 
SNM, combined with satellite telecommunication facilities, turned out to be 
very useful means for the Xawilaad companies, and later lead to the spread of 
efficient telecommunication companies in post-collapse Somalia. Today, there 
are several Xawilaad companies with branches wherever in the world Somalis 
live, and scattered all over Somalia. Through this network, a Somali can transfer 
money to a family member inside Somalia within 24 hours. Today, Xawilaad is 
the most efficient, and safest, way of transferring money to, and inside Somalia. 
Even the international NGOs use it extensively. The system became a strategic 
asset in the civil war economy, and is still the most important means for the 
clan-based social safety net for most Somalis.  
 
 
Who remits? 
Diaspora Somalis in the West is believed to be the most significant source of 
remittances after the labour market tightened in the Gulf and the refugee crisis 
occurred in the 1990s. Hence, the source of remittances changed during the 
civil-war. In the 1980s, it was primarily migrant workers in the Gulf States and 
Saudi Arabia who remitted about 60 per cent of the total estimated money 
transfers to Somalia (Gundel 2003). Outside the Arab states, it was only in the 
UK and Italy that a Somali diaspora of any significance in terms of remittances 
could be found. After the outbreak of civil war, conflict-related refugee flows to 
Western Europe and Northern America changed the remittance pattern. Thus, a 
result of the civil war was the growth of the diaspora and the volume of 
remittances. One difference between the civil war related migrations and the 
previous labour migrants is that the former most often were families settling in 
host countries including women and children, while the migrant workers almost 
always were males seeking work who would usually return home (Ahmed, 
2000). Somali exiles in the West lived mostly off welfare allowances that were 
intended to meet only their most basic needs. Hence, these families would not 
transfer as much of their income as would the lone males who went to the 
Middle East for work. Another difference is that with the civil conflict, the elite 
had fled the country, leaving the market to other social strata. A reflection of this 
change is that during the 1980s, two-thirds of the funds from the Somali 
communities abroad were used for trade, and the other third to assist families. 
Today these proportions are probably reversed (Gundel 2003). 
 
 
How much is remitted? 
Problems with measuring the scale of remittances to Somalia include the 
frequent lack of reliable survey data on income, savings and remittance 
behaviour, leading researchers to rely on more anecdotal evidence regarding 
average transfers. In part of Somalia, security issues complicate household 
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surveys, and local fears of reductions in aid may discourage declaring remittance 
income.  
 
According to old surveys made by the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
in 1985, the 165,000 to 200,000 Somalis living in the Middle East earned $700 
million dollars a year, of which approximately 30 per cent – $280 to $370 
million dollars – was sent back to their native country. Annual remittances to 
Somalia in 1987 were estimated to be between US$478 to $540 million (Gundel 
2003). The latest estimates on the scale of remittances suggest that the annual 
transfer through Xawilaad companies may be more than US$1 billion (WB 
2006). This is a considerable amount when set in relation the official 
development assistance (ODA) and humanitarian aid combined, which in 2004 
amounted to US$272 million (WB 2006).  
 
One survey finds an average household receipt of remittances per annum in 
Somaliland was about US$4,170 and its share of household income was 64 per 
cent (Ahmed, 2000). If these estimates are correct, and there are about 120,000 
recipient households throughout Somaliland, then the total value of the annual 
remittances is about US$500 million, which would be about four times the value 
of livestock exports from Somaliland in a normal year. Remittances to Southern 
Somalia are not documented.  
 
Factors affecting remittance transfer are as yet poorly understood. Some 
migrants send remittances, some do not. There is no systematic research 
evidence on the incidence of remittance sending in the Somali diaspora or on 
comparative incidences of remitting among different migration cohorts and in 
the first and second generation. Migrants mainly send remittances to family 
members only, but sometimes also to friends and business partners (Omer 
2002). A survey of 166 remittance-receiving households in Hargeysa in 1998 
found that most remitters lived in Europe or North America, 40 per cent of 
remitters were women, roughly as many wives support husbands as husbands 
support wives, and that 35 per cent of remittance-receiving households received 
money from two to eight migrants (Ahmed 2000). Transfers to cover family 
needs appear to range from US$ 50 to US$ 500 per month (Omer 2002; UNDP 
2001). According to interviews with Somali families in Denmark, relatives in 
Somalia receive between US$100 and US$200 per month on average. 
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The links between Diaspora transfers and development 
Remittances are transferred in different forms and through different channels, as 
cash or goods in kind, through remittance companies, through merchants, or 
through relatives. But, what are the remittances used for and what is their real 
potential impact on development? 
 
What are the remittances used for? 
Historically, remittances have been used to finance consumption and as such are 
crucial for household livelihoods. Consumption has only little developmental 
effect, but does contribute to the existence of trade, markets and import 
businesses. The latter is unfortunate, as much of the money is being spent on 
expensive imports, with no local developmental effects. The same thing goes for 
the use of khat as the plant is all imported from Kenya or Ethiopia.  
 
But recent observations show a new trend where remittance money increasingly 
is being invested in small businesses or real estate, an increasingly dominant 
feature of the Somali economy. Furthermore, some Somalis do their utmost to 
manage their income properly by, for instance, investing in the education of 
their children, although primarily through school fees and less so through 
concerted pooling of their money to run schools. In a few cases, as will be 
described further in section 3, there are examples of Diaspora Somalis 
organising themselves for broader community development projects in their 
places of origin. But, mostly, larger scale investments from Somalis abroad are 
based on private basis and not collective or associative basis. A fact that is 
reflecting one of the main causes of the State Collapse, namely the collapse of 
trust in state, public and collective arrangements of any kind.  
 
There are also a few examples where Diaspora uses their collected remittances 
for charity and peace. For instance, during the summer of 2005, Somalis in 
Sweden collected and transferred funds aimed at assisting the national 
reconciliation by removing roadblocks in Mogadishu. Other, examples include 
financing of hospitals (i.e. Edna Maternity Hospital in Hargeysa , private 
individual based) and successful higher education institutions (i.e. Amoud 
University in Somaliland, collective diaspora support). The main challenges 
confronting diaspora assistance and involvement in Somalia is their 
fragmentation, and private orientation towards own family or community only.   
 
The structural effects on development of remittances are limited. The flow of 
remittances increases in times of economic stress, during droughts, or in 
response to inter-clan warfare. The positive aspect of increasing consumption 
through remittances in Somalia in the 1980s was that this did improve the real 
balance of payments and enabled imports of capital goods and raw materials for 
industrial production. The high level of consumption and imported goods, 
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however, left only little surplus for capital-generating investments, while the 
demand on consumer goods increased inflation and pushed up wage levels. So, 
the immediate positive effects in terms of easing the effects of rising oil prices 
and increasing living standards turned into negative effects in the long run as 
they were spent on “non-productive” investments, which increased dependency 
and eroded incentives for production. Some positive effects did come out of 
increases in trade, but these did not have the same long-term effects, such as 
investment in a productive sector. On the other hand, remittances in Somaliland 
in recent years have been used less for consumption and unproductive 
investments, but instead contributed significantly to the growth of a vibrant 
private sector (Ahmed, 2000). This process, however, is associated with loss of 
educated and skilled labour, and increased income inequality. The booming 
sectors are also limited by the lack of credit schemes and saving facilities. 
 
 
Social aspects of remittances 
The latter point of unequal development is important, and is not sufficiently 
reflected in most of the available studies (including the present study) because 
the prime focus is on the ethnic Somali migrants proper and only their practices 
in terms of development effects. Thus, the existing studies often only concern 
the nomadic Somalis, and far less the agropastoralists Rahanwein and Digil 
people, Gosha, Bantus, and other “minorities” such as the Barawani/Bajuni 
cultures along the coast. All of these groups do not seem to have been in a 
position to travel outside Africa. But, they did seek refuge in IDP camps, and 
did migrate to the neighbouring countries from where this study has not been 
able to gather any data on their remittance, trade, or other practices. 
Nevertheless, remittances do play the role of a social safety net, preventing 
economic collapse in the face of setbacks such as drought and recurring Saudi 
Arabian livestock bans. Studies of remittances to Hargeysa, Burco, and 
Bossasso calculated that remittances constitute nearly 40 per cent of the income 
of urban households (UNDP Somalia, 2001). Preliminary data from a survey 
conducted by the UNDP indicates that on average, remittances constitute 22 per 
cent of per capita household income (UNDP Somalia, 2001). It should be noted 
that the volume of remittances received by households depends a lot on the 
quality of telecommunications, the organization and the welfare of the 
community, and the distance between Xawilaad relays and the beneficiaries of 
the transaction (Pérouse de Montclos, 2003). 
 
There is an urban bias in the distribution of remittances. For instance, while a 
majority of households in Hargeysa received remittances, only 5 per cent of 
rural households did (Ahmed, 2000). Pastoral households receive even less. For 
agro-pastoralist households, remittances from migrant workers in urban areas 
are more important than international ones, thus suggesting an indirect flow of 
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international remittances to rural households. Remittances both reflect and serve 
to increase the economic differentiation in society. According to UNDP 
Somalia, for historical, social, and political reasons, remittances are more 
common in urban rather than rural areas, and the main beneficiaries of 
remittances tend to be urban households with educated and skilled members in 
the diaspora (UNDP Somalia, 2001). 
 
Due to a history of better access to education, political privilege, or accident of 
geography, some social groups and clans have a higher percentage of their 
members in the diaspora than others. Migrant workers and refugees tend to 
come from better-off families who can afford to invest in sending a family 
member abroad. The rural poor and the internally displaced from groups who 
have fewer relatives abroad receive fewer remittances and are less well served 
by telecommunications. For example, in Hargeysa and Bossasso, there is clear 
evidence of significant differential access to remittances between urban 
residents and displaced populations and economic migrants from southern 
Somalia. 
 
The Xawilaad remittance system is the structure that links the diaspora with 
families in Somalia. Somalis returning from the diaspora have brought new 
businesses, ideas, and technologies. Unfortunately, while many in the diaspora 
express a desire to return to Somalia, insecurity, poor social services, and 
employment opportunities dampen the incentives to do so. The huge number of 
Somalis returning to Somalia on vacation, going there to reconnoitre, is 
evidence of interest in return. Somalis maintain close links with their country of 
origin, a prospect that keeps alive the hope that this diaspora could play a 
structural role in the reconstruction of Somalia. But, it remains to be seen 
whether the second generation of Somali immigrants abroad will continue to 
remit money to relatives they do not know in a country they may never have 
visited (Pérouse de Montclos, 2003). 
 
The practice of remitting money has important consequences on the diaspora, as 
they may represent 20 to 30 per cent of the households’ income. Elders may 
exert high pressure on their communities to send funds home. That is why some 
blame the remittance system for perpetuating a clan-based, segmented society. 
On the other hand, this development is mitigated by the tendency of Somali 
families in the West to change toward the Western nuclear type (Pérouse de 
Montclos, 2003). 
 
If the remittances can be transformed into long-term productive capital 
investments, as there is a tendency towards in Somaliland, then they will be far 
more valuable for economic development than development aid. But just as 
important is the flow of “know how”. The opportunity for the diaspora to 
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acquire education abroad is a potential asset if they return. Yet, the structure of 
pay levels and job opportunities work against this. This is perhaps an area where 
development aid could be used in the reconstruction of the future Somali 
polities, by providing salaries in a transitional period for well-educated Somalis 
who want to return. 
 
It is also important that aid is not linked too narrowly and rigidly with 
repatriation of the Somali diaspora to Somalia. If aid is used to push repatriation, 
before the diaspora is ready for it, then they may well decide against and choose 
the socially most secure option – to stay abroad. On the other hand, if they are 
seen as potential catalysts for development in Somalia, a door is kept open for 
them to stay in their host countries, and they are provided with education, skills, 
and working experience – perhaps in long-term programmes aimed at starting 
businesses or education in Somalia. Then, there is a prospect for a constructive 
relationship between aid, development, and diaspora. 
 
Remittance systems themselves contribute considerably to the Somali economy 
by facilitating all sorts of businesses. Somali traders use foreign exchange 
bought from migrants to buy their goods, and use remittance systems themselves 
to make payments to partners. Remittance companies are used by aid agencies 
for payroll and contract payments. Remittance systems also facilitate foreign 
direct investment in Somalia, the vast majority of this coming from Somali 
nationals living abroad (Drysdale 2000). Moreover, many Somali remittance 
companies invest in other industries (or vice versa), particularly import/export, 
construction, real estate and telecommunications.  
 
 
The Diaspora as a Non-Traditional Donor to Education 
The following section is more an anecdotal set of examples of how the Diaspora 
has engaged as ‘donors’ to development, particularly in the education sector, in 
Somalia. It is hence not a systemic survey, but provides a picture of how they do 
engage, and leads to an outlining of opportunities and problems in supporting 
such initiatives. 
 
First, the section will take a look at the Diaspora perspectives on contributing to 
development in Somalia within the context of where they are settled abroad. 
Secondly, some examples of how more organised contributions by Diaspora to 
development in the education sector is provided together with some examples of 
Diaspora organisation for home development, which can be important for 
understanding how these initiatives eventually can be supported.  
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Diaspora perspectives on contributing to Somalia3  
 
Middle East 
The remittances of the pre-civil war Somalis who went to the Middle East 
(particularly Yemen, Saudi Arabia and UAE), was primarily used for families’ 
investment in properties, construction of houses and consumption. Most of the 
Somalis who went to work in the oilfields were young men. Some women did 
get employment as domestic workers or as nurses. Almost all were segregated 
from the local population. Since the Middle East countries did not normally 
provide citizenships and employee rights to foreigners, who were expected to 
leave when employment contracts expired, there was and is not a strong 
incitement to base a long term strategy here. Somalis often were subjected to 
basic rights violations by contractors who reject to pay their fees or provide 
holiday compensations.  
 
Hence, Somalis in the Middle East are vulnerable and not properly integrated 
into the social, economic and political system. There are, however, few 
exceptional cases. Qatar and Oman do provide Citizenship for some Somalis. In 
Dubai, UAE, Somalis has been trying to build centres for business engagement 
that involve global marketing and exchange. Somalis from all over the world 
generally uses Dubai as their financial and trade centre for their businesses with 
Somalia itself. But, here too Somalis do not enjoy full rights and there are many 
uncertainties about their legal residence status. Because of that they are reluctant 
to invest and engage into long term projects in Dubai. Thus, through their 
remittances and trade with Somalia, they are considered major players in the 
reconstruction of Somalia. Hence, a considerable part of the financing as well as 
educational system in particularly Mogadishu is channelled by Somali business 
people who maintain the Mogadishu – Dubai and Gulf of Arabia linkage. 
 
In June 1993, the idea of establishing a private University came about when a 
number of professors of the former Somali National University and other 
prominent Somali intellectuals, not at least linked to the Al-Islah group, which 
generated funding from Kuwait amongst other places in the Middle East, 
congregated in Mogadishu to discuss the case of the students of the destroyed 
Somali National University4. The group decided to form the University of 
Eastern Africa. The aim was to provide opportunities for Secondary School 
leavers to enter further education. Hence, their immediate aim was to re-
establish Faculties of Islamic Studies and Languages of the former National 
                                                          
3  The following information is gathered by interviews with Somali diaspora members in 
Europe, North America, Middle East and Communities inside Somalia, conducted by the 
author of this study, Abdulkadir Osman Farah, from January to July 2007.  
4 http://mogadishuuniversity.com/historical.html   
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University. This university initiative was founded in privately owned houses in 
the Southern part of Mogadishu, near Medina Hospital. However, the flares of 
the civil war had reached the University site. After one week from the opening 
date of the new University, the warring militias looted all its properties 
including furniture, library books, vehicles and documents. As a result, the 
project was temporarily suspended. But, September 22, 1997, Mogadishu 
University was officially opened as non-government and non-profit institution 
for higher learning, governed by the Board of Trustees and the University 
Council, mainly funded by Diaspora and charities from the Middle East.  
 
 
United Kingdom, United States and Canada  
Somalis in the UK belong to the more marginalised community groups. They 
are not performing well in education and employment, but fare better in private 
business than elsewhere in Europe. In USA the situation is different, as the 
Somalis are not as excluded from their host communities. The Somalis in North 
America are said to be the most resourceful among Somalis. The reason could 
be that the USA initially attracted students and well educated groups. Later the 
ruling elite and former government officials also went to the either Canada or 
the USA. More importantly, Somalis consider North America to provide 
possible and successful integration and opportunities. Somalis in the UK and 
North America are the most active in the development of Somalia. They are 
involved politically, socially and economically.  
 
Remittances are the prime contribution to Somalia from the Northern American 
and UK Diaspora. However, the UK and North American Diaspora are leading 
in the recent emerging construction and small industries enterprises in Somalia 
itself, as well as in the telecommunications sector. Somalis in the UK, USA and 
Canada are organised in community association which mostly mobilise Somalis 
to bring assistance to Somalia in periods of emergency such as droughts and 
floods.  
 
Information technology is increasingly being used to increase the links between 
Diaspora and the Somalis in Somalia. An interesting case is the new satellite TV 
station, Universal TV. This station also shows a typical global Somali business 
venture as the station is owned by a businessman based in the UK and Dubai, 
running businesses in telecommunication and satellite instruments. The owners 
introduced their station to contribute to the development and reconstruction of 
Somalia (own interview), by helping Somalis abroad and Somalis at home to 
connect. Recently, the station has taken a significant role in mobilising Somali 
diaspora to support projects in Somalia. During the recent emergency in and 
around Mogadishu, the response was massive, particularly from Somali women 
abroad who remitted aid through the station, who then organised to hand out to 
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victims of the fighting there. Time will tell, but it seems that stations such as the 
Universal TV, and the Internet will have impact on the way the Somali diaspora 
engage with regard to the development in their country.  
 
Denmark   
Although, Somalis arrived in large numbers to Denmark, the Danish public and 
the authorities did not pay particular attention to this culturally dissimilar 
people. Two major events had important implications not only on the 
relationship between the host nation and the Somalis, but also the overall public 
perception and legislative approach to the wider immigrants in Denmark. The 
Somali family structure is totally different from Danish. The Danish nuclear 
family structure is strange to Somalia and among the Somalis in Denmark. 
Although mother, father and children are important for the Somali family 
perception, this does not necessarily exclude, the extended family to be 
considered the obvious family. Hence, the Somalis practise of bringing their 
extended family to Denmark outraged the general public opinion on them, as it 
was seen as an abuse of the asylum they got in Denmark and the Danish social 
welfare system. Practices of FGM in Denmark by Somalis have also not helped 
their image to the Danes. 
 
The consequences of such issues are the implementation in Denmark of very 
restrictive migration laws. DNA tests were introduced to avoid the import of 
extended family members.  The main consequence of the Somali situation in 
places like Denmark is that remittances are mostly derived from the base of 
social welfare, which is closely linked to their status in Denmark. Hence, there is 
a strong reluctance amongst the Somali Diaspora here to break their status to 
Denmark, in order to provide more actively to Somalia and eventually move 
back to contribute with their acquired skills. Therefore, Somalis in welfare states 
needs to find options where they can contribute to development without losing 
their basic security in the host country.  
 
On the other hand, the Diaspora in Scandinavian countries learns other skills, 
such as associational organisation from their host societies. Based on that kind 
of inspiration, Somalis here do organise themselves in association with the aim 
of contributing to development in Somalia in a more concerted and organised 
manner, and maybe even with the prospect of paving the ground for return. An 
example of such an organisation in SomScan-UK: 
 
SomScan-UK is an umbrella group of Somalilanders based in Scandinavian 
countries and the UK. Established in 1999, it has collectively bought a block of 
land near Burao town in Somaliland. The objective was to build homes where 
members of the group can return and live. The project involved 330 families, 
who collected funds from themselves, and used the Xawilaad company Dahab 
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Shiil extensively to transfer the money and facilitate the project in its early 
stages. Later the project gained EU funding, and was supported by the Danish 
Refugee Council to construct some infra structural facilities to the new 
settlement as well as for the local community. Members of the SomScan group 
are furthermore involved in the development of Burao University.  
 
Italy  
The relationship between Somalia and Italy is historical, as Italy colonised the 
southern and most productive part of the country. During the latter part of the 
Second World War, South Somalia briefly came under British rule. After 2nd 
WW, the UN designated Italy to administer under UN mandate to prepare 
Somalia for independence. Many Somalis, therefore, received their education by 
Italians and many in Italy. Naturally, many of these Somalis established 
relationships with Italy. Some even decided to stay in Italy to pursue further 
careers and education. After independence, the Italy and the Soviet Union 
became the main contributors to the education and development sectors of 
Somalia. Many of those who settled in Italy belonged to the best educated 
groups among the Somalis. Italians who worked in Somalia assisted the 
resettlement of their employees in Mogadishu, especially during the height of 
the civil war. These Somalis are still in Italy and some became Italian citizens 
and themselves brought relatives from Somalia. Although, during the civil war, 
the Somalis only considered Italy as a transit destination on their route to 
countries such as Scandinavia, UK and North America.  
 
With regard to the development and relationship with the host nation and their 
country of origin, Somalis joined efforts and established organisations to help 
themselves and the people back home. One such organisation is called Italo-
Somalo and is based in Roma. This organisation is created by people with a 
mixture of Italian and Somali background and educated Somalis. They do 
activities for integration and development to help Somalis in Italy and in 
Somalia. In addition there are number of women organisations that are involved 
in helping Somali women in Italy and women and children in Somalia. Unlike 
Scandinavia and some other western countries, Italy does not have an inclusive 
welfare system. Thus immigrants and refugees just receive a minimum support. 
This pressures Somalis to look for jobs to survive. The lack of proper welfare 
also influences the diaspora organisations that spend more energy and resources 
for helping people to get jobs rather than building up institutions and supporting 
their country of origin. On the other hand, Italy is the only country in Western 
Europe that still provides special favour and treatment for the Somali 
immigrants. For instance Somali immigrants are entitled to get one year 
residence permit if they are approved to be a proper refugee. This annual 
residence permit is renewed every year until the individual acquires permanent 
status and later citizenship.  
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COSV is an Italian NGO that linked with a local NGO IIDA, established by 
Somali women during the early civil war, notably Starlin Arush. The 
organisation runs a number of schools with more than 3000 students. This is an 
example of strong individual engagement by Somalis to do social work in 
Somalia. Starlin Arush was until her untimely death in 2002, the driving force 
linking her organisation with external donors, and the family links to Italy as 
well as Canada. When she died, her brother Mohamed Arush left his academic 
career at the University of Toronto to replace her at COSV.  
 
Eastleigh, Kenya  
Eastleigh is located in the eastern part of Nairobi, Kenya. There has been a large 
Somali presence for a very long time, but since 1990s, Eastleigh became the 
home for thousands of Somalis, mostly refugees from the civil-war. Initially the 
Somali refugees settled in makeshift refugee camps in the Northern districts 
bordering Somalia. Subsequently they resettled to Eastleigh to pursue better 
opportunities. Though confronting numerous social and political challenges, the 
new Somali arrivals succeeded to transform this neighbourhood to a large 
commercial neighbourhood trading number of goods. There is an estimated 
25.000 Somalis living in and around Eastleigh.  
 
Eastleigh is probably the second most important Somali diaspora business centre 
in the World after Dubai. Among the residents in Eastleigh you find the most 
prominent business people from Somalia. Some of them own hotels and large 
properties while conducting huge business international enterprises. The fact is 
that most Somalis come to Eastleigh as refugees with none or few belonging. 
Over time they remarkably succeed in establishing themselves while providing 
assistance for relatives back home. Many Somalis in Eastleigh are engaged in 
small business enterprises. There are also various humanitarian and educational 
activities taking place in Eastleigh. The neighbourhood also houses numerous 
private schools that teach children from basic Quranic teachings to advanced 
schooling. As refugees in Kenya, Somalis do not get formal jobs, so most 
support themselves through informal job undertakings.  
 
Through complex networks of friends and relatives, the business communities in 
Eastleigh, Dubai and Bakaara market in Mogadishu engage in activities that are 
not only providing profits for the business community but also for the wider 
ordinary Somalis. Members from the business community in Eastleigh claim 
they support local schools and charities through the annual saka payment and 
periodical subsidiary. However, to increase the effects of such charitable 
support, the communities and their local authorities needs to be supported in 
terms of building their capacity to utilise and absorb the remitted assistance.    
  
 18
Community – Diaspora efforts at building education in Somalia  
There are two types of primary education forms in Somalia today. Community 
based education and donor based education. Community based education is 
most often the form where we find the most significant diaspora contributions.  
 
An interesting example of Diaspora support to developing educational 
institutions in their home community is the case of Ceel-Dheere town. Ceel 
Dheere is located in the Northern Eastern part of Galguduud Region in South 
Central Somalia, about 18 km from the Indian Ocean. This case shows the 
potentials of the diaspora engagement in home-development, when they move 
from merely remitting a monthly amount of money to their relatives to a more 
pro-active engagement oriented towards specific development activities. The 
collapse of public institutions following the civil war was also felt here, as the 
primary school closed down. The school was only reopened in 1993 when the 
CISP began to fund and reconstruct in the district. The agency paid among other 
things the salaries of the teachers. This program ended in 2002 when CISP 
suspended its humanitarian work in the region. But, the schools did not close 
down when CISP ended their support.  Interestingly, they continued to function 
now supported by a joint effort led by local business groups in close cooperation 
with the Ceel-dheere diaspora. On the 2nd of April 2007, the Ceel-dheere 
community abroad held a meeting in London bringing together their diaspora 
from Europe and North America to discuss how they can promote education and 
economic growth in Ceel-Dheere. Among the participants were academics, 
business men, politicians and community organisers. After a long discussion it 
was agreed to invest in the construction of a secondary school in Ceel-Dheere. 
The decision to build a secondary school was based on the fact that when the 
children in Ceel-dheere conclude their primary and intermediate education, they 
have to go to Mogadishu to obtain secondary school education. Hence, it would 
help the community a great deal to have its own secondary school. Fifty percent 
of the needed funds to construct the school were collected already at the 
meeting. The rest was promised to follow after the meeting. The pattern of 
constructing the secondary school is similar to many other diaspora Somalis and 
their connection to their regions. What is interesting is that traditional elders and 
women groups in Somalia play a significant role in mobilising and bring 
diaspora groups together. In this case, it was Xaaji Axmed Cali Culusow who 
led the delegation from North America who demonstrated his commitment by 
declaring that the diaspora in North America would take a “lions share” to build 
the secondary school. They also found a local manager to the project, and a 
trustee was established with an education board. 
 
Another examples is the ‘Ayuub Humanitarian Organisation’ that was 
established in the aftermath of  civil war in 1992 in the coastal town of Merka, 
90 km south of Mogadishu. The organisation was founded by the activist 
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diaspora returnee Lady Mana Sultan Abdirahman. She found that it was their 
moral obligation to respond to the suffering of their people, especially women 
and children. She belongs to a prominent family widely respected in and around 
Marka. She succeeded to organise national and international resources to create 
this Ayuub humanitarian organisation, with the objective of providing child and 
mother development care. Other objectives include empowerment of vulnerable 
groups such as women, children, and victims of the harsh and challenging 
conflict environment. To begin with, ‘Ayuub’ focused on security and fought 
against exclusion, harassment and discrimination of women and children. Later 
on, the focus shifted to education and training in vocational trades such as 
farming and other basic skills to strengthen women’s ability to pursue economic, 
social and economic opportunities. The organisations has been supported by 
humanitarian organisations such as WFL (Water for Life is an Italian NGO), 
WFP and UNICEF. The organisation runs an orphanage and assigns adoptive 
parents to take care of the children. Although the organisation is non-profit, it is 
professionally organised as there is a board and membership in different 
categories. 
 
Another example of diaspora remittances in support of a collective initiative is 
‘Ruudi’, which is an umbrella organization that supports seven local community 
groups (four agricultural, a school, a civil society forum and an enterprise 
development group) in Western Hiiraan. Much of the organization’s funds have 
been raised by Somalis in London and Dubai. 
 
Puntland and Somaliland 
With regard to macroeconomic framework both Somaliland and Puntland base 
their fiscal management on low revenue from trade and import and export taxes. 
These revenues are mainly spent on security and general administration. Public 
goods such as infrastructure and social services receive minimum expenditure, 
making sectors such as education dependent on external aid or private 
contributions mainly from the local business community or the diaspora.  
 
During 2005 and 2006 the primary education system in Puntland improved due 
to a better management structure, committed leadership in terms of ensuring 
efficiency and most significantly the various community initiatives and diaspora 
contribution. Furthermore local and international NGO also provide valuable 
contribution to the structure and upgrading of primary functioning schooling 
system. These community led initiatives mobilize resources from the community 
itself, local and international NGOs and in some cases the Somali diaspora to 
construct school infrastructure. For instance, the Red Horn of Africa is a 
charitable organization set up in 2001, which established and supports Irro 
Primary School in Bursalah in Puntland for 400 children aged 5–16. It is funded 
by a group of Somalis in Australia, New Zealand, North America, Europe, the 
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Middle East and Africa, held together by family and clan connections and their 
support of the project. 
 
In Somaliland, diaspora communities mostly invest in houses and properties. 
More recently they began to invest in education and development. For instance 
most of the school fees in major cities in Somaliland are paid by diaspora. There 
are three universities, various youth and vocational training and primary and 
secondary schools. Most of these are private and sponsored by the diaspora. The 
significance of diaspora contributions to the economy of Somaliland is vital, 
according to the former Minister of Finance, Mohammed Said ‘Gees’: “if there 
is no diaspora, there is no life in Somalia or Somaliland” (Interview in Hargeisa, 
February 2007). Up to 60% of Somaliland’s income is based on remittances 
from abroad. This is not sustainable in the long term. Long term projects should 
be established. The concern is that the generation that currently remit might get 
older and those born in the diaspora might not remember their parents´ country 
of origin, and will eventually stop remitting. 
  
One of the most important examples of community and diaspora run educational 
institutions in SL is the Amoud University. This is a community-owned non-
governmental national University that welcomes all aspiring candidates who 
fulfil the admission requirements without discrimination based on sex, ethnic, 
origin, creed, colour or religion. The idea of establishing Amoud University was 
conceived by four diaspora intellectuals working in the Gulf in 1994 and was 
formally proposed in a workshop held in Borama on August 6, 1996. The 
workshop agreed to the proposal and adopted a resolution for the establishment 
of the University by 1997. Somalis linked to Borama helped to set up the 
University, now a community-owned institution, which still depends 
substantially on contributions from the international aid, diaspora as well as the 
local population to pay its staff. 
 
Mainly there are three models of diaspora contributions. The first is the 
extended family network who is engaged in economic remittance to support 
relatives back home. The problem with this model is that it reinforces kinship 
loyalties produces little with regard to development that strengthens the 
economy or common public goals such as a national educational programme. 
Thus, it has private particularistic ends, which is the reason many Somali 
politicians will claim that there is nothing to benefit from remittances because 
that is entirely in the private domain. Another model, which seems to be 
increasingly practised, but which is vulnerable and could benefit from support is 
the associational model, which is a process whereby community associations in 
the host nation mobilise themselves and organise collective support to 
developmental projects and activities back home. A more ambitious ‘transitional 
partnership model’ where several diaspora communities work together in host 
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nations to engage in joint projects with a more national perspective would 
probably be more efficient. However, like the previous model, this requires first 
that the communities in Somalia organise themselves and articulate their needs 
to their diaspora collectively. Secondly, it requires that the Somali Diaspora 
itself is genuinely organised across clan-lines in serious associations. Both these 
latter points are in principle areas where organisational and associational support 
from outside their sphere could be useful in terms of building management 
capacities and strategies. However, that would call upon a non-traditional kind 
of co-operation where the usual aid agencies work together with refugee and 
community associations as well as local and regional governments in the North 
to create such support at both locations.   
 
 
Policy Relevant Conclusions 
This study has attempted to describe the linkages between migration related 
resource transfers, and the potential importance of diaspora resource transfers 
for the development of the education sector in Somalia As the paper shows, the 
linkages can have both positive and negative effects on the other. The study is 
hampered by the lack of statistical data on Somalia. With these limitations in 
mind, the following tentative conclusions and recommendations can be drawn. 
 
International migration in the context of recent Somali history has been driven 
by political factors, and thus is not only economic or poverty related. Poverty 
has only been an indirect factor. Rather, the main reason for migration has been 
the intertwining of political conflict and the search for economic opportunity. 
 
Since independence, aid has mainly been used as an asset in the internal power 
struggles of Somalia, and has not produced the intended development.  
 
The economic remittances from Somali diaspora communities have enormous 
significance for the survival and dynamics of the Somali economy. Remittances 
have been far more important for the survival of people than development and 
humanitarian aid put together. 
 
Poverty- and refugee-related migration are less prone to have developmental 
effects in countries of origin, as women and children tend to settle in the country 
of destination for good, as opposed to single migrant labourers who also remit a 
larger amount of their income. 
 
The patterns of refugee flight, asylum, and repatriation among Somalis illustrate 
very clearly the significance of familial ties and mutual cooperation in their clan 
based society. 
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Remittances are mainly used for consumption, and have limited investment 
effects as consumption is mostly based on imports. On the other hand, under 
certain circumstances of political stability and trust in the political and economic 
environment, the Somali diaspora may invest in real estate, production, and 
trade. 
 
Thus, the effect of remittances on development correlates with political stability 
and the quality of enabling environment for productive investments. 
 
While Somalis globally maintain their links to their families, and to their 
cultural, linguistic and religious heritage, the concern is whether that will 
continue in the future.  
 
Peace and security challenges still remain the main challenge for the diaspora, 
the Somali authorities and for the international organisations. Their frustration 
centres on the lack of achieving progress in this front.  
 
During the 17 years of Somali civil war, there was an obvious lack of proper 
institutions under which organised humanitarian and developmental efforts 
could be conducted. Evidences conducted during this preliminary study indicate 
that institutional framework in Somalia should improved.  
 
The situation appears somehow better in the autonomous regions of Puntland 
and Somaliland. In Puntland and Somaliland, the authorities have begun respond 
to demands from diaspora communities to invest more in education and business 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Increasingly, the wealthy Somalis among the Diaspora do venture into investing 
their money in businesses in Somalia, and sometimes also in the social sector. 
Hence, private schools are emerging either as private individual businesses, or 
more collective engagements where resourceful Diaspora Somalis from the 
same home community join together to establish a private school. Another 
resource transfer in this connection is when they bring their acquired educations, 
skills and inspirations with them to Somalia. 
 
An example of collective Diaspora support to educational development in their 
home community us the establishment of a secondary school in Ceel-dheere. 
This involved diaspora groups from UK and US in close cooperation with civil 
society and intellectuals in the region of Ceel-Dheere, who work together with 
the clan elders, academics and women and youth groups in mobilising and 
collecting resources.  
 
One area where support to these diaspora-e community linked initiatives would 
make sense, is to help them build educational strategies. For instance, there is 
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tendency towards wanting secondary school and higher educational training 
such as Business Administration, which is seen as very prestigious – but, not 
necessarily what the community needs. Indeed, there is a more direct need for 
vocationally skilled people such as carpenters, masons, mechanics, electricians, 
nurses etc. It should be possible to attract Somalis amongst the Diaspora with 
such skills to temporarily or permanently contribute to reconstruction and 
training.   
 
The UNDP administered QUESTS programme is one example of support to 
skilled Diaspora Somalis who are needed in development projects. However, 
this programme needs to better think through the programme in terms of 
providing better incentives to attract the Somalis into such programmes, as well 
as making it easier for the joint diaspora – home community associations to 
apply for such funds. 
                                                      
The Somali Diaspora is the best trained and skilled among the Somalis, their 
valuable knowledge should therefore be transferred. One option is to use 
programmes such the UNDP QUESTS programme to provide incentives for the 
skilled Somali Diaspora to return at teach at Diaspora-Home Community driven 
educational projects, whether private or collective.  
 
The study shows that there is a potential for supporting joint Diaspora and 
Community driven social sector development projects, such as local educational 
initiatives. The option is to assist and strengthen and encourage partnerships 
between diaspora groups (diaspora associations), governmental institutions 
(local & national), community associations (traditional and professional) and 
international organisation (NGOs and the UN) in a tri-partite partnership.  
 
The Tri-partite partnerships would be between the Diaspora Association, the 
Community (including existing formal governmental authorities) and the 
International Aid organisations involved.  
 
The support needed would be organisational management training and capacity 
building to the Diaspora Association and Community Associations alike. Such 
assistance should primarily be based in their joint needs, and not what the 
International Organisations want. Capacity building entails primarily strategic 
needs assessments by the communities themselves (identification of education 
needs, and the kind of skills and inputs needed from Diaspora), accountability 
and good governance of collective funds, and support to Diaspora Communities 
to gain support from communal/municipal schemes to help long term education 
strategies of the Diaspora Youths towards types of education which is 
specifically needed in Somalia.  
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